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Using a panel of 5,999 small and medium-sized Belgian enterprises (SMEs) over the period 
2002-2008, we identify three measures of investment opportunities suitable for unlisted firms. 
We then estimate firm-varying investment-cash flow sensitivities (ICFS) from reduced-form 
investment equations that include these measures, and compare them with those derived from 
a model that does not control for investment opportunities. We find that all our models yield 
similar ICFS estimates, which are significantly related to a wide set of proxies for financing 
constraints. These findings suggest that the ICFS of SMEs do not simply reflect investment 
opportunities.  The  investment  opportunities  bias  may  therefore  have  been  overstated  in 
previous literature.  
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A  number  of  researchers  have  argued  that,  within  a  reduced-form  Q  model  of 
investment,  a  significant  cash  flow  coefficient  may  simply  reflect  the  effect  of 
increased investment opportunities not properly accounted for by Tobin’s Q, rather 
than  signaling  financial  frictions  (Gilchrist  and  Himmelberg,  1995;  Erickson  and 
Whited, 2000; Bond et al., 2004; and Cummins et al., 2006). This problem is usually 
referred  to  as  the  investment  opportunities  bias,  and  is  central  in  the  debate  on 
whether investment-cash flow sensitivities (ICFS) can be considered as useful proxies 
for financing constraints. 
To resolve this  issue, alternative proxies for investment  opportunities  have 
been proposed in the literature. Examples of these are Fundamental Q (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg,  1995),  Tobin’s  Q  corrected  for  measurement  error  (Erickson  and 
Whited, 2000), financial analysts’ earnings forecasts (Bond et al., 2004; Cummins et 
al.,  2006),  and  contracted  capital  expenditures  (Carpenter  and  Guariglia,  2008)
1. 
However, opinions are still mixed as to whether the remaining cash flow effect after 
controlling for investment opportunities   in various ways  can be considered  as  an 
adequate proxy to capture financing constraints.  For instance, while Carpenter and 
Guariglia (2008) find that  ICFS remain statistically significant for small firms, which 
suggests that they are adequate proxies for liquidity constraints,  Cummins et al. 
(2006) and  Bond et al. (2004)  argue  the opposite.  Most of the literature which 
addressed the investment opportunities bias has focused on large listed companies, 
which are less likely to suffer from financing constraints than their small unquoted 
counterparts  (Carpenter  and  Petersen,  2002;  Beck  and  Demirg uc-Kunt,  2006; 
Guariglia, 2008; Becchetti et al., 2009). To the best of our knowledge, no paper ha s 
directly addressed the effects of the bias with focus on small unlisted companies. Our 
main contribution is to fill this gap in the literature.  
The  widely  known  investment  opportunities  proxies,  such  as  Tobin’s  Q, 
Fundamental  Q,  or  financial  analysts’  earnings  forecasts  cannot  be  computed  for 
unlisted companies because market values are not commonly available for them, and 
                                                           
1 Fundamental Q is defined as the expected value of Marginal Q estimated using VAR forecasting 
techniques. Contracted capital expenditures are defined as contracts entered into for the future purchase 
of  capital  items,  expenditure  on  machinery,  equipment,  plant,  vehicles,  and  buildings,  for  which 
nothing has been paid by balance sheet date.  While authors such as Bond et al. (2004) and Cummins et 
al. (2006) use financial analysts’ earnings forecasts to construct an alternative measure of investment 




because these firms are usually not followed by analysts. Consequently, we identify 
three different proxies for investment opportunities, which can be used in the analysis 
of unlisted firms’ investment behavior. These proxies are an accounting proxy for 
Marginal  Q  developed  by  Honda  and  Suzuki  (2000),  a  sales  accelerator  term 
(Guariglia, 2008; Bakucs et al., 2009), and a proxy based upon the industry-level 
growth in added value.       
Our second contribution is methodological: for the first time, we make use of a 
Bayesian estimator to derive firm-level ICFS. The estimation of ICFS at the firm-level 
rather than at the sample level was initially proposed by D’Espallier et al. (2008) and 
Hovakimian & Hovakimian (2009). The main advantage of this methodology is that  
the adequacy of the ICFS estimates in capturing financing constraints can be studied 
in detail in an ex-post analysis. Specifically, the estimated firm-varying sensitivities 
can be regressed on a number of proxies for financing constraints, in order to observe 
how much of their variation can be  explained by these observable variables
2. We 
advance this literature by using a Bayesian estimator to derive our firm -level ICFS. 
This methodology allows for a full probabilistic i nference of all parameters, without 
relying on any normality assumptions. We then provide  an ex-post evaluation of the 
ICFS  derived  from  three  models  that  differ  in  their  contr ol  for  investment 
opportunities, and compare the results with those obtained from a model that does not 
control for them. This approach enables us to assess which of the models produces the 
ICFS that fits best with the proxies for financing constraints. 
We focus on small and medium-sized unlisted firms operating in Belgium over 
the period 2002-2008. Our choice of Belgium is motivated by the fact that it is an 
established market economy, where few companies are listed on the stock exchange 
                                                           
2 Papers in the financing constraints literature typically partition firms ex-ante into more and less likely 
to face financing constraints based on a number of criteria such as size, age, the dividend payout ratio 
and so on. They then estimate separate investment regressions for the different sub-groups of firms and 
interpret a higher estimated aggregated ICFS in the financially constrained group as evidence in favor 
of the presence of financing constraints (see Schiantarelli, 1995; Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2007, for surveys of this literature). Instead of partitioning the sample into categories, other 
authors prefer to interact cash flow with dummies indicating whether firms are ex-ante more or less 
likely  to  face  financing  constrains  (e.g.  Kaplan  and  Zingales,  1997;  Guariglia,  2008).  Ex-ante 
classifications  of  firms  are,  however,  likely  to  be  inaccurate  and/or  endogenous.  Moreover,  an 
aggregate  estimated  ICFS  in  a  certain  sub-sample  could  contain  information  about  unobservable 
economic phenomena completely independent of financing constraints (D’Espallier et al., 2008). Our 
ex-post analysis of the estimated firm-varying ICFS enables us to test for the presence of financing 





3. As unlisted firms are more likely than listed ones to suffer from 
asymmetric information problems and, hence, from financing constraints, Belgium 
represents an ideal setting for a study  of the effects of these constraints on firm 
behavior. Moreover, a comprehensive dataset containing rich accounting information 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is available.  
Our  results  show  that,  whichever  the  way  we  control  for  investment 
opportunities, we obtain  very  similar firm-varying  ICFS  estimates.  Moreover, the 
correlation between the firm-varying ICFS derived from all our models is particularly 
high, and our  firm-varying ICFS estimates are significantly related to a wide set  of 
proxies for financing constraints. These findings suggest that investment -cash flow 
sensitivities do not simply reflect increased investment opportunities. In fact, even for 
the benchmark model that does not take up any control for investment opportunities, a 
large  proportion  of  cross -sectional  variation  in  the  estimated  ICFS  can  still  be 
attributed to the existence of financing constraints. This suggests that  the investment 
opportunities bias may have been seriously overstated in previous literature.  
The remainder of this  paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we 
discuss the relevant literature on financing constraints, with specific emphasis on the 
investment opportunities bias, and the recent empirical advances that focus on firm-
varying ICFS. Section 3 describes our dataset, illustrates our measures of investment 
opportunities,  and  presents  some  descriptive  statistics.  Section  4  introduces  the 
investment equations with different controls for investment opportunities  that we 
estimate, discusses our estimation methodology, and describes our ex-post analysis 
aimed at validating our estimated ICFS. Section 5 summarizes our empirical results. 





2.1 ICFS and the investment opportunities bias 
ICFS  have  a  long-standing  tradition  in  the  empirical  literature  on  financing 
constraints. In their seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) predict, for the first time, that 
the investment response to a change in cash flow might be a good proxy to assess the 
                                                           
3 Deloof (1998) documents that in November 1995, the total stock market capitalization of Belgian 




degree  of  financing  frictions  a  firm  faces.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  financially 
constrained firms find it impossible or too expensive to access external finance, and 
depend therefore mainly on their internal funds to finance investment. As a result, a 
positive ICFS is expected for firms more likely to face financing constraints, but not 
for  financially  healthy  firms.  Fazzari  et  al.  (1988)  and  many  subsequent  studies 
provide empirical  support for this  assertion,  by showing  that  ICFS  are higher  for 
groups of firms classified ex-ante as more likely to face financing constraints
4. 
Most of these studies estimate reduced-form investment equations augmented 
with cash flow within the  Q model framework, where Tobin’s Marginal Q (usually 
proxied by the firm’s market-to-book value) is included as a control for investment 
opportunities. As has been noted by authors such as Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), and Bond et al. (2004), this analysis is only valid if the 
firm’s market-to-book value is an adequate proxy to capture the firm’s investment 
opportunities. Otherwise, instead of signaling financing constraints, a significant cash 
flow coefficient could simply reflect increased investment opportunities not captured 
by the market-to-book value. As the ability of the market-to-book value to properly 
capture  firms’  investment  opportunities  has  been  frequently  questioned  in  the 
literature (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond et al., 
2004; Cummins et al., 2006), the so called investment opportunities bias has posed a 
serious impediment for empirical studies in the field, and has incited many researchers 
to look for alternative proxies for investment opportunities, in order to isolate the 
effects  of  cash  flow  due  to  financing  constraints  from  those  due  to  investment 
opportunities. For instance, Erickson and Whited (2000) construct measurement error-
consistent  GMM  estimates  of  Marginal  Q.  Along  similar  lines,  Gilchrist  and 
Himmelberg  (1995)  suggest  the  use  of  Fundamental  Q,  which  is  defined  as  the 
expected value of Marginal Q estimated using VAR forecasting techniques. Bond et 
al. (2004) and Cummins et al. (2006) use financial analysts’ earnings forecasts as a 
proxy for Marginal Q. Other studies use completely different proxies to capture the 
firm’s investment opportunities. Among these, Kadapakkam et al. (1998) include the 
ratio of lagged sales to net fixed assets as an additional explanatory variable, and 
                                                           
4  See  for  instance,  Devereux  and  Schiantarelli  (1990),  Hoshi  et  al.  (1991),  Oliner  and  Rudebusch 
(1992),  Deloof  (1998),  and,  more  recently,  Carpenter  and  Petersen  (2002),  Bond  et  al.  (2003), 
Alayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Bhagat et al. (2005), Islam and Mozumdar (2007), Lyandres (2007), 
and Ağca and Mozumdar (2008). Also see Schiantarelli (1995), Hubbard (1998), and Bond and Van 




Carpenter  and  Guariglia  (2008)  use  the  contracted  capital  expenditure  as  a  direct 
proxy for the firm’s investment opportunities.  
These studies reach contrasting conclusions with respect to the link between 
ICFS and financing constraints. For instance, while some find that, once improved 
measures of investment opportunities are used, investment is still sensitive to cash 
flow especially for financially constrained firms (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; 
Carpenter and Guariglia, 2008), others remain highly skeptical on the ability of the 
ICFS to capture financing constraints (Cleary, 1999; Erickson, and Whited, 2000; 
Bond et al., 2004; Cummins et al., 2006). In summary, although most researchers are 
aware of the problem of a potential investment opportunities bias, opinions on the 
effects of the bias on ICFS differ significantly.  
 
2.2 Proxies for investment opportunities for unlisted firms 
Most of the financing constraints literature is based on panels of listed companies. 
Yet, a number of very recent studies focus on small businesses to study the effects of 
financing constraints (Becchetti et al., 2009; Guariglia, 2008). As these studies point 
out, SMEs constitute an interesting group to focus on because asymmetric information 
problems  are  likely  to  be  particularly  severe  for  these  firms,  which  usually  have 
limited access to external financial markets (Hughes, 1994; Lopez-Garcia and Aybar-
Arias, 2000). Additionally, SMEs tend to have lower borrowing capacity because of 
limited track-records and more static asset bases, which lower their collateral value 
(Binks and Ennew, 1996; Voordeckers and Steijvers, 2006). Finally, small businesses 
are usually unquoted and, therefore, cannot draw upon the stock market to attract 
external funds (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). In sum, SMEs might face much tougher 
conditions than their larger counterparts to access external finance. They therefore 
represent an ideal group to focus on when studying financing constraints (Holod and 
Peek, 2007).  
Focusing  on  small  unlisted  businesses,  however,  poses  the  challenge  of 
finding suitable controls for firms’ investment opportunities. Market-information is in 
fact not available for them, and they are typically not followed by analysts, which 
makes it impossible to compute traditional proxies such as the market-to-book value, 
Fundamental Q, or analyst’s earnings forecasts. To the best of our knowledge, only a 




case of unlisted firms. Most of these studies use sales growth to control for these 
opportunities (Bakucs et al., 2009; Guariglia, 2008; Konings et al., 2003).  
In this paper, we identify three different proxies for investment opportunities, 
suitable  for  unquoted  firms.  We  then  compare  the  ICFS  derived  from  investment 
models that include these proxies with those obtained from a benchmark model where 
investment opportunities are not controlled for. This analysis enables us to indirectly 
assess  the  ability  of  these  proxies  to  satisfactorily  capture  firms’  future  growth 
opportunities,  and,  consequently,  the  ability  of  ICFS  to  proxy  for  the  degree  of 
financing constraints faced by firms.  
 
2.3 Firm-varying sensitivities and ex-post analysis 
A  number  of  recent  papers  (D’Espallier  et  al.,  2008;  Hovakimian,  2009;  and 
Hovakimian and Hovakimian, 2009) analyze firm-specific sensitivities, rather than a 
single sample-level ICFS estimate
5. These studies emphasize that this seemingly small 
methodological alteration allows us to deal with a number of problems related to the 
traditional framework that have been identified in previous literature. First, it avoids 
working  with  sample -level  estimates  that  might  be  po tentially  biased  due  to 
endogeneity  or aggregation bias  (Bond et al., 2003).  Second, it avoids having to 
partition the observations beforehand using a classification criterion that might be  
endogenous or even ambiguous with respect to financing constraints  (Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995). Finally, the new methodology enables us to test the ability of our 
estimated ICFS to capture financing constraint  explicitly, using an ex-post analysis. 
Specifically, the estimated firm-level sensitivities can be regressed on a set of proxies 
for financing constraints  in order to  assess  how much of  their  variation  can be 
explained by these observables. 
                                                           
5 D’Espallier et al. (2008) use a Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) estimator to estimate ICFS 
directly as firm-varying cash flow coefficients in a reduced-form investment regression. In contrast, 
Hovakimian  and  Hovakiminan  (2009)  and  Hovakimian  (2009)  calculate  the  firm-varying  ICFS 
indirectly. The former compute the  difference between the cash flow weighted time-series average 
investment  of  a  firm  and  its  simple  arithmetic  time-series  average  investment,  and  claim  that  this 
difference  should  be  higher  for  firms  investing  more  in  high-cash  flow  years.  Hovakimian  (2009) 
estimates a reduced-form investment regression which excludes cash flow, and measures the firm-
specific ICFS as the difference between the average of the error term derived from this regression 
weighted by firms’ cash flows and its unweighted average. She claims that if a firm’s investment is not 
affected by its cash flow, then the average weighted error term should not be statistically different from 
the average unweighted error term, while the opposite would happen in case of a positive correlation 




We believe that this novel set-up provides an interesting framework to study 
the  investment  opportunities  bias  more  in  depth  than  has  been  done  in  previous 
literature. As D’Espallier et al. (2008) point out, different models can be evaluated 
using  the  ex-post  evaluation  procedure,  and  the  ‘best’  model,  i.e.  the  one  that 
produces  the  ICFS that  fit  best  with  the  proxies for financing constraints, can be 
identified. We use this methodology to evaluate the performance of three models that 
contain  three  different  controls  for  investment  opportunities  suitable  for  unlisted 
firms.   
 
3. MODELS AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Investment models 
We analyze three reduced-form investment models, which include different controls 
for investment opportunities suitable for unlisted firms, and compare the ICFS derived 
from these models with those obtained from a benchmark model, where investment 
opportunities are not controlled for.  
 
3.1.1 Marginal Q model. The first model (Marginal Q model) uses an accounting 
proxy of Marginal Q suggested by Honda and Suzuki (2000). It can be expressed as 
follows:    
 
                                                                                    (1) 
 
Ki,t is the real capital stock of firm i at time t, calculated using a forward iteration
6; 
(I/K)i,t and (CF/K)i,t are the investment rate and cash flow rate. δi and ηt are a firm-
specific effect and a time-specific effect, and ui,t is the idiosyncratic component of the 
error.  qi,t  is  the  proxy  for  Marginal  Q  suggested  by  Honda  and  Suzuki  (2000)
7. 
Building on the work by Yoshikawa (1980) , Honda and Suzuki (2000)  show that, 
                                                           
6 As in Honda and Suzuki (2000), we compute the capital stock using a forward iteration based on the 
firm’s depreciation policy. Specifically, the book value of net fixed assets one year prior to the start of 
the sample period is taken as the starting value for capital stock. Then, in subsequent years, the capital 
stock is calculated as                               , where ρit is firm i’s depreciation rate in year t. Our results 
were robust to simply using the book value of tangible fixed assets as a proxy for the capital stock.  
7 It should be noted that Honda and Suzuki (2000) focus their paper on large Japanese firms. Their 
proxy for investment opportunities is therefore not directly aimed at unlisted firms. Yet, because this 




under the assumptions of constant returns to scale and static expectations, Marginal Q 
can be expressed as the ratio of profit per unit of capital to the cost of capital, i.e.:       
 
      
                
                           (2) 
 
where πi,t is gross profit (defined as ordinary income plus depreciation and interest 
payments, minus taxes); pt is the price deflator for investment goods; rt is the average 
after-tax nominal cost of debt; and d is the overall depreciation rate
8. By allowing for 
a lagged dependent variable in Equation (1), we account for the potential lumpiness of 




3.1.2  GGAV model. In our second model (GGAV model), we use the industry-level 
growth  in  gross  added  value  (GGAV)  as  an  alternative  proxy  for  investment 
opportunities. Added value is considered as an overall measure of efficiency. It is 
plausible to assume that exogenous efficiency shocks within a disaggregated industry 
give  rise  to  a  number  of  investment  opportunities  for  all  firms  operating  in  that 
industry
10. We therefore estimate the following equation: 
 
                                                                                       (3) 
 
where, denoting with XS,t, the value of production and subsidies in industry S in year 
t
11; with US,t, the total amount of expenses on intermediary goods in industry S in year 
t; and with Δ, the difference-operator, GGAV can be expressed as follows:  
 
                                          (4) 
 
                                                           
8 As in Honda and Suzuki (2000), we use an exogenous value of 7.5% for the overall depreciation rate.  
9 We experimented with different lags of both dependent and independent variables and found that the 
most appropriate lag structure was that of Equation (1). 
10 Using industry-level variables to control for investment opportunities closely follows the intuition of 
Whited and Wu (2006).  




3.1.3  Accelerator model. In our third model (Accelerator model), we include the 
ratio of lagged sales to capital stock (S-1 /K ) as an additional independent variable in 
the investment equation. This yields:   
  
                                                                                           (5) 
 
The ratio of lagged sales to capital stock is designed to reflect the sales accelerator 
theory  of  investment  and  has  been  used  as  a  determinant  for  investment  in 
Kadapakkam et al. (1998), Hoshi et al. (1991) and Guariglia (2008)
12. 
 
3.2 Estimation methodology  
We  initially  estimate  equations  (1),  (3),  (5),  and  a  dynamic  investment  equation 
augmented  with  cash  flow,  which  does  not  control  for  investment  opportunities,  
using OLS, a fixed-effects estimator, a first-difference GMM estimator (Arellano and 
Bond,  1991),  and  a  system-GMM  estimator  (Blundell  and  Bond,  1998).  We  then 
compare the sample-level ICFS estimates derived from these models. The GMM first-
difference estimator  accounts for unobserved firm  heterogeneity by  estimating the 
equation in first-differences. We control for the possible endogeneity of the regressors 
by instrumenting them with values of themselves lagged twice or more
13. The system-
GMM estimator is similar, except for the fact that it estimates the relevant equation in 
first-differences and levels in a system. The instruments in the differenced equation 
are values of the regressors lagged twice or more, while in the levels equation, the 
first-difference of the regressors lagged once are used as instruments. 
Following D’Espallier et al. (2008), we then move on to estimate firm-varying 
ICFS. To this end, we allow the cash flow coefficients in the reduced-form investment 
equations to vary across firms, by introducing slope heterogeneity into the investment 
equations (1), (3), and (5) as follows: 
 
                                                                                     (6) 
                                                           
12 Our results were robust to using the sales growth to capital ratio instead of the ratio of lagged sales to 
capital. 
13 As has been noted by many authors, cash flow and our investment opportunities measures  are likely 
to be endogenous in our investment equation (Bond et al., 2003; Erickson and Whited, 2000). The first-
difference GMM and system-GMM estimators account for this potential endogeneity bias and have 





                                                                                      (7) 
 
                                                                                            (8) 
 
In  all  specifications,  β2,i  is  the  firm-varying  ICFS,  which  measures  the  firm’s 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow after controlling for investment opportunities 
using in turn Marginal Q, GGAV, and the Accelerator term.  
From  a  technical  point  of  view,  the  estimation  of  the  parameters  from 
equations (6) to (8) is not an easy task for three reasons. First, the equation does not 
comply with the functional form of a typical linear panel data model such as a fixed 
effects or random effects model. Second, the number of parameters to be estimated is 
large with  respect  to  the number of data-points  which makes parameter estimates 
unstable and unreliable due to the loss in degrees-of-freedom. This is often referred to 
as  the  problem  of  ill-positioning  causing  traditional  regression  techniques  to  fail 
(Fraser, 2000; Golan et al., 1996). Finally, estimating the equations using traditional 
OLS-based techniques would involve many normality assumptions. In addition to the 
usual  exogeneity  assumption  that  requires  the  error  to  be  independent  from  the 
regressors, one also has to assume normality for the heterogeneous intercept as well as 
for  the  heterogeneous  slopes.  Yet,  it  is  widely  documented  in  the  econometrics 
literature that such normality assumptions are never met in practice and especially not 
when working with non-experimental data. This problem of ill-conditioning which is 
especially  severe  in  social  science  research  causes  parameter  estimates  to  be 
inaccurate and specification tests to be unreliable (Fraser, 2000).  
In conclusion, there are sufficient technical arguments to refrain from using 
traditional regression techniques when modelling heterogeneous slopes in the context 
of panel data. We therefore estimate Equations (6) to (8) using a Bayesian estimator. 
As has  been noted by several  authors, the Bayesian estimation  method is  a more 
appropriate method when modelling heterogeneous slopes because it allows for a full 
probabilistic  inference  of  all  parameters  including  the  firm-varying  ones,  without 
relying on any normality assumption (Berry, 1996). Alternatively, as Hansen et al. 
(2004) put it, the Bayesian estimation method is a more congruent empirical approach 




meaningful interpretation of firm-level results. Details about this estimation procedure 
can be found in the Appendix. 
 
3.3 Ex-post analysis 
In order to assess the extent to which our estimated firm-varying ICFS are adequate 
measures  of  financing  constraints,  we  next  regress  them  on  a  set  of  proxies  for 
financing constraints, and analyze whether the signs  of the coefficients  associated 
with each of these proxies are consistent with our expectations. This will be referred 
to  as  our  ex-post-analysis.  We  use  a  wide  selection  of  variables  as  proxies  for 
financing constraints, which are related to the firm’s size, liquidity, profitability, and 
leverage positions, as well as the firm’s dependence upon external finance. All the 
variables investigated have been used in previous literature on financing constraints. 
Several  papers  have  noted  that  financially  constrained  firms  usually  pay  fewer 
dividends (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988), are smaller (e.g. Carpenter and Petersen, 2002), 
hold less cash (e.g. Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), are more leveraged (e.g. Moyen, 
2004;  Whited  and  Wu,  2006),  and  have  lower  profitability  ratios  (Kaplan  and 
Zingales, 1997; Cleary, 1999) than their unconstrained counterparts. In our ex-post 
regression analysis, we therefore expect to observe a negative relationship between 
our estimated ICFS and the dividend payout ratio, total assets, the cash ratio,  the 
interest coverage ratio, and EBIT; and a positive relationship between our estimated 
ICFS and leverage. In addition we investigate the link between ICFS and the firm’s 
dependence on external finance measured as the share of investments in fixed assets 
that cannot be financed with internally generated funds. This variable has been used 
as an exogenous measure for financing constraints in a recent paper by Duchin et al., 
(2010). We therefore expect a positive relation between the estimated ICFS and the 
dependence on external funds. 
In Table 1, we summarize the different proxies for financing constraints that 
we consider, the relationship we expect them to have with firms’ financing constraints 
status, and the sign we expect them to display in our ex-post analysis.   
 







4. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
4.1 Data 
Balance  sheets  and  income  statements  were  extracted  from  the  Bel-first  dataset 
published by Bureau Van Dijk for a large sample of Belgian SMEs over the period 
2002-2008. According to the standard OECD definition, a SME is defined as a firm 
with less than 250 full-time equivalent employees, total assets less than €45,000,000, 
and turnover less than €50,000,000. Based on a two-digit NACE classification, we 
excluded firms active in the agricultural sector (NACE 00-05), the financial sector 
(NACE  65-67),  and  the  service  sector  (NACE  60-64).  Firms  with  less  than  5 
employees were also removed from the dataset since these firms have usually a low 
asset base and low investment needs.  
Our final dataset consists of 5,999 firms over 7 years, which is equivalent to 
41,993 firm-year observations. Outliers were removed from the dataset by trimming 
the highest and lowest 1% of the distribution of the key variables. This is a standard 
procedure in the literature on financing constraints (Bhagat et al., 2005). Additionally, 




4.2 Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in our analysis
15. The 
median firm in our sample has total assets of € 1.3 million and annual sales of € 1.8 
million. The median firm’s sales growth is 5.63%; its investment rate, 18.07%; and its 
cash  flow  rate,  31.65%
16. The dividend payout ratio has a mean of  0.91% and a 
median value of 0.00%, indicating that the majority of Belgian SMEs do not pay out 
any dividends. The debt ratio has a mean value of 65.71%, which indicates that on 
average, firms have exhausted much of their debt capacity. Looking at  the cash ratio 
(median value 6.24%), we see that cash reserves are not particularly high. Similarly, 
                                                           
14  As  in  D’Espallier  et  al.  (2008),  the  following  criterion  was  used  to  identify  extreme  values: 
observation x is an extreme value if Q1 – (3 * IQR) > x > Q3 + (3 * IQR), where Q1 and Q3 are its first 
and third quartile, respectively, and IQR is its inter-quartile range.  
15 As all our investment models include a lagged dependent variable, the year 2002 is used to construct 
the latter. Our estimates are therefore based on the years 2003-2008. For consistency, our descriptive 
statistics also refer to this same time period. 
16 Note that firms in Belgium are not required to report thei r sales. This explains the large number of  




the interest coverage (median value 1.86) and the EBIT to total assets ratio (median 
value 4.58%) suggest that profitability is also not particularly high during the sample 
period. Overall, the summary statistics seem to indicate that financing constraints may 
have been severe in our sample.   
 
<  Insert ‘Table 2. Summary statistics’ around here  > 
 
In Table 3 we analyze our proxies for investment opportunities (Marginal Q, 
GGAV,  and  the  Accelerator  term)  in  detail  by  providing  a  number  of  summary 
statistics for each of these proxies in each of the years making up our sample. As can 
be seen there is considerable variation over the sample period for all three proxies 
investigated.  Moreover,  all  three  proxies  point  towards  increased  investment 
opportunities in later years (2006-2008) in comparison with earlier years (2003-2005) 
of the sample period
17.    
 
< Insert ‘Table 3. Investment opportunities proxies’ around here > 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Reduced-form investment equations 
Table  4  reports  the  estimates  of  our  reduced-form  investment  equations,  obtained 
using  standard  regression  techniques.  Besides  the  OLS  estimator  and  the  fixed-
effects-estimator (FE), we also make use of the GMM first-difference estimator, and 
the  system-GMM  estimator  to  account  for  the  potential  endogeneity  of  the 
regressors
18.  
Panel A of Table 4  reports the regression results for the model without any 
control for investment opportunities, and for the Marginal Q model. In Panel B, we 
report the regression results for the GGAV model and the Accelerator model. As can 
be seen from column (1), cash flow is highly significant at the 1% significance level 
with an estimated coefficient of 0.47, which suggests that a 1% increase in cash flow 
is  associated with  an increase in  investment of  0.47%.  Lagged investment  is  also 
                                                           
17 GGAV, however, shows a drop in 2008, which was probably due to the effects of the financial crisis. 
18 Note that the estimates obtained  using the first-difference GMM estimator are based on a smaller 
sample than those obtained using the other estimators, as one observation per firm is lost through the 




highly significant at the 1% significance level with an estimated coefficient of 0.17. 
As a result, the long-run investment response due to a change in cash flow is 0.56
19. 
As can be seen comparing columns (1) and (2) , the OLS and FE estimators produce 
very similar results. In columns (3) and (4), we report the first-difference and system-
GMM estimates. Again, cash flow and lagged investment are highly significa nt with 
estimated values of 0.57-0.58 and 0.06-0.08, respectively, leading to a long-run ICFS 
of 0.61 in both cases. The validity of the instruments was tested using the Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions,  as well as the  m2  test  of  serial  correlation  of  the 
differenced residuals
20. Both tests do not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the 
instruments are valid. The ICFS estimates obtained using GMM are higher than those 
obtained with OLS and the fixed-effects estimator. This may reflect the fact that the 
latter suffer from endogeneity bias.  
 Estimates of the Marginal Q model are reported in columns (5) to (8) of Panel 
A of Table 4. We can see that the proxy for Marginal Q is always highly significant at 
the 1% significance level, with an estimated coefficient of 0.02 and 0.05 respectively 
in the OLS and the fixed-effects cases, and a coefficient of 0.01-0.02 in the GMM 
cases. In line with the benchmark model with no control for investment opportunities, 
lagged investment and contemporaneous cash flow are always highly significant at the 
1% level, leading to a long-run ICFS of 0.43 and 0.56 in columns (5) and (6), and 
0.69 and 0.67 in columns (7) and (8). The long-run ICFS obtained when investment 
opportunities are controlled for using Marginal Q are very similar to to those obtained 
in the model with no control for investment opportunities. Once again, in columns (7) 
and (8), the Sargan and m2 tests do not reject the validity of the instruments. 
Panel B of Tables 4 presents the estimates obtained using the Accelerator and 
GGAV  models.  Estimates  of  the  former  are  presented  in  columns  (1) to  (4),  and 
estimates  of  the  latter  in  columns  (5)  to  (8).  Columns  (1)-(4)  indicate  that  the 
Accelerator term is a positive and significant determinant for investment, regardless 
of the estimation method being used. In line with the other models, lagged investment 
                                                           
19 This is given by the coefficient of cash flow divided by 1 minus the coefficient of lagged investment.   
20 The Sargan test is a test for overidentifying restrictions. Under the null of instrument validity, this 
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to the number  
of instruments less the number of parameters. The  m2 test is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal under the null of no second-order serial correlation of the differenced residuals, and provides a 
check on the legitimacy of variables dated t-2 as instruments in the differenced equations. Since the 
most recent instruments used in our first-difference and system-GMM estimations are of the order t-2 
(2
nd lags), we only report the tests for 1
st and 2




and contemporaneous cash flow are always highly significant and the long-run ICFS 
are  very  similar  to  those  obtained  with  the  other  models.  GGAV  is  a  significant 
determinant of investment with an estimated coefficient of 0.18 and 0.17 in the OLS 
and fixed-effects cases, and of 0.04 in the first-difference and system GMM cases. 
Again,  lagged  investment  is  always  highly  significant  and  the  long-run  ICFS  is 
around 0.53 in columns (1) and (2), and around 0.63 in columns (3) and (4). The ICFS 
estimates are very similar to those obtained in the benchmark model with no control 
for  investment  opportunities,  and  in  the  Marginal  Q  model,  and  the  diagnostic 
statistics indicate that our instruments are valid.  
In summary, the analysis in Table 4 indicates that both Marginal Q and GGAV 
are highly significant in the cash flow-augmented reduced-form investment equations. 
The Accelerator term is also positive, although significance levels are generally lower. 
Cash  flow  always  remains  highly  significant  at  the  1%    level  when  the  different 
proxies of investment opportunities are used, suggesting a significant sensitivity of 
investment  to  cash  flow,  which  persists  even  after  controlling  for  investment 
opportunities. Additionally, lagged investment  always displays a highly significant 
and positive coefficient, indicating that the long-run investment response due to a 
change in cash flow is significantly higher than the short-run investment response.  
As the ICFS estimates are very similar across the different models that we 
estimated, we can conclude that using different controls for investment opportunities 
has only a minimal impact on the sample-level ICFS estimates.  
 
< Insert ‘Table 4. Reduced-form investment equations’ around here > 
 
5.2 Firm-varying ICFS estimates 
Panel A of Table 5 reports summary statistics for the firm-varying long-run ICFS 
estimated from  the benchmark model  (column  1), Marginal  Q  model (column 2), 
Accelerator model (column 3), and GGAV model (column 4), using the Bayesian 
estimation procedure. The table shows that the mean ICFS is 0.55 for the benchmark 
model which does not control for investment opportunities, the Accelerator model and 
the GGAV model, and 0.51 for the Marginal Q model. Although the differences are 
rather small, the median ICFS is also slightly lower for the Marginal Q model in 




The vast majority of firms (68.5%, 52.7%, 68.3% and 68.6%, respectively for 
the benchmark, Marginal Q, GGAV, and Accelerator models) have a long-run ICFS 
in the range of 0.50 to 1. Yet, in a limited number of cases, the firm-varying ICFS 
values  are  negative  (suggesting  that  firms  may  increase  their  investments  despite 
drops in cash flow or vice versa), or larger than 1 (suggesting that the investment 
response may be larger than the original cash flow shock)
21 
Panel B of Table 5  analyzes the correlation between the firm-varying ICFS 
estimates obtained from the different models, making use of the Pearson correlation 
coefficient. We can see that the  correlation coefficients are very high and always 
statistically  significant:  firms which  display a high  (low)  ICFS  in  the benchmark 
model with no control for investment opportunities  will also display a high  (low) 
ICFS in the other models.  
In summary, in line with the regression analysis presented in the previous sub-
section,  these  findings  confirm  that  including  different  proxies  for  investment 
opportunities in our models has a very limited impact on the ICFS estimates. 
 
< Insert ‘Table 5. Firm-varying ICFS-estimates and their correlations’ around here > 
 
5.3 Ex-post analysis of financing constraints 
Table 6 reports the regression results from the ex-post analysis in which the firm-
varying  long-run  ICFS  estimates  obtained  using  the  Bayesian  estimator  for  the 
benchmark model (column 1), the Marginal Q model (column 2), the Accelerator 
model (column 3), and the GGAV model (column 4) are regressed against several 
proxies of financing constraints. Overall, the regression outputs return the signs that 
were hypothesized in Table 1.  
Column (1) shows that the firm-varying ICFS estimated from the benchmark 
model  with  no  control  for  investment  opportunities  are  negatively  related  to  the 
dividend payout ratio, the cash ratio, the EBIT to assets ratio and the interest coverage 
ratio. The coefficients on the debt ratio and external finance dependence are positive 
and significant. These findings indicate that firms with a higher ICFS pay out fewer 
dividends, carry less cash and are significantly less profitable. Furthermore, they have 
higher debt levels and depend more on external finance. These results suggest a tight 
                                                           
21 See Guariglia (2008) for a discussion of how negative cash flow coefficients can be interpreted in an 




link  between  the  firm-varying  ICFS  and  financing  constraints.  Contrary  to  the 
predictions reported in Table 1, in all models, firm size is positively related to the 
firm-varying ICFS, suggesting that large firm are more financially constraints than 
their smaller counterparts. This apparently counter-intuitive result can be explained 
considering that within our sample of SMEs, the larger firms may be less financially 
flexible  and  less  able  to  make  use  of  working  capital  to  alleviate  the  effects  of 
financing  constraints  on  fixed  investment.  Similar  results  were  obtained  in  the 
Chinese context by Chow and Fung (2000) and Ding et al. (2010).  
Interestingly, as can be seen from columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table 6, the 
regression  results are very similar when using the ICFS computed from the other 
reduced-form  investment  equations.  In  general,  we  observe  similar  signs,  similar 
coefficient magnitudes, and similar confidence levels, regardless of the model under 
study
22.  This  indicates that the  ICFS derived  from the Marginal  Q,  GGAV,  and 
Accelerator models are all positively related to the existence of financing constraints.  
 
< Insert ‘Table 6. Ex-post regression analysis’ around here > 
 
5.4 Mean values in different ICFS classes 
Following  D’Espallier  et  al.  (2008),  Hovakimian  and  Hovakimian  (2009),  and 
Hovakimian (2009), in Table 7, we report mean values for the proxies for financing 
constraints  in  different  classes  defined  on  the  basis  of  our  estimated  ICFS. 
Specifically, firms are assigned to the high ICFS class if they have an estimated ICFS 
above the 70
th percentile of the ICFS distribution. Similarly, firms are assigned to the 
low ICFS class if they have an estimated ICFS below the 30
th percentile
23.  
The results, which are presented  in Panels A, B ,  C,  and D of Table 7, 
respectively for the benchmark model, the Marginal Q model, the GGAV model, and 
the Accelerator model, are in line with the ex-post regression analysis presented in 
Table 6. In particular, firms assigned to the high ICFS class are in general less liquid 
                                                           
22 We also ran the analysis with sales and sales growth excluded from the ex-post regression. This 
increased the number of observations because sales are often not reported (see footnote 16). Similar 
results to those in Table 6 were obtained.     
23  A  drawback of this analysis , which we report to ensure comparability of our findings with the 
literature,  is that the r esults are dependent  on  the  choice of cut-off points. We experimented with 
different cut-off points and the results remained similar. Performing the ex -post analysis in terms of a 
regression aimed at explaining the determinants of the firm-level ICFS (as discussed in Section 5.3) is a 




in terms of their cash ratio, and have lower profitability, and a lower coverage ratio 
than firms assigned to the low ICFS class. Furthermore, firms in the high ICFS class 
have  higher  debt  levels  and  show  a  higher  dependence  on  external  funds.  The 
independent  t-tests  indicate  that  the  differences  between  the  groups  are  generally 
highly  significant.  Once  again,  these  results  hold  regardless  of  the  way  in  which 
investment opportunities are controlled for.   
      In  summary,  all  our  models  yield  similar  ICFS  estimates,  which  are 
significantly related to a wide set of proxies for financing constraints. These findings 
suggest that the ICFS of SMEs are unlikely to simply reflect investment opportunities.  
 




The  empirical  literature  on  financing  constraints  is  characterized  by  a  substantial 
debate surrounding the role of cash flow in reduced-form investment equations. Some 
studies argue that positive and statistically significant ICFS signal the presence  of 
financing constraints (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Gugler et al., 2004), while 
others  conclude  that  cash  flow  is  a  significant  determinant  of  investment  simply 
because it captures investment opportunities (Erickson and Whited, 2000; Bond et al., 
2004;  Cummins  et  al.,  2006).  This  so-called  investment  opportunities  bias  has 
hindered further advances in this literature.   
In this paper, we study the effects of the investment opportunities bias in a 
large sample of unlisted Belgian SMEs. We first identify three different measures of 
investment  opportunities,  which  are  suitable  for  unlisted  firms.  We  then  use  a 
Bayesian estimator to derive firm-varying ICFS for different reduced-form investment 
models  that  include  these  controls  for  investment  opportunities,  and  regress  these 
estimates on a wide variety of proxies for financing constraints. In line with recent 
studies in the field such as Hovakimian and Hovakimian (2008) and D’Espallier et al., 
(2008), this exercise gives us an indication of the extent to which the ICFS resulting 
from a particular model can be related to the existence of financing constraints.  
Our results indicate that the ICFS derived from all models are significantly 
related  to  our  set  of  proxies  for  financing  constraints.  Additionally,  the  different 




between the ICFS obtained from the different models is particularly high. Even the 
benchmark  model  with  no  control  for  investment  opportunities  has  considerable 
explanatory power in terms of financing constraints. Overall, these findings suggest 
that the ICFS of unlisted SMEs do not simply reflect investment opportunities, but 
signal the existence of financing constraints. The investment opportunities bias may 
therefore have been overstated in previous literature.  
Our  research  could  be  extended  in  several  directions.  First,  it  would  be 
interesting to see whether our results hold for other investment models, such as the 
error-correction  model  (Bond  et  al.,  2003;  Guariglia,  2008)  or  the  Euler-equation 
model (Whited, 1992). Second, other proxies for investment opportunities could be 
developed in the context of small unlisted businesses. Third, although our ex-post 
regression analysis is based on a wide variety of financial variables that have a long-
standing tradition in the literature, other proxies for financing constraints could be 
analyzed. This could offer interesting opportunities to look for other determinants of 
the ICFS. Fourth, in this study, the Bayesian estimator has been used to estimate the 
firm-varying  ICFS.  Yet,  this  is  not  the  only  estimator  suited  to  tackle  slope 
heterogeneity in the context of panel data. It would be interesting to assess whether 
our results hold with alternative estimation techniques. Finally, it would be interesting 
to see whether similar results can be found for different countries, characterized by 
different degrees of financial development. These extensions are in the agenda for 
future research. 
 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX ON BAYESIAN ECONOMETRICS 
According to the Bayesian philosophy, parameters are estimated by combining prior 
information on these parameters with data, using Bayes’ theorem, i.e. 
 
                                    (A1)  
 
Equation  (A1)  represents  the  continuous  version  of  Bayes’  conditional 
probability theorem, stating that the distribution of a certain parameter , conditional 
on the data y, p(θ|y) can be calculated by combining the distribution of the data p(y|θ) 
with the prior distribution on the parameter p(θ). The term p(y|θ) is generally referred 




of  the  parameter.  The  element  p(θ)  is  referred  to  as  the  prior  information:  it 
summarizes all existing prior knowledge on the parameter. The outcome of combining 
these two elements is the posterior density p(θ|y), which summarizes the new and 
updated belief of the parameter θ based upon what was already known about the 
parameter (the prior) and new evidence brought on by the data (the likelihood). This 
whole process of combining likelihood and prior information into a posterior density 
is also referred to as ‘Bayesian updating’ or ‘Bayesian learning’. 
Although the mathematical foundation of the Bayesian method dates back to 
the work of reverend Thomas Bayes (1702-1761), it was only in the late 1980s that 
this mathematical formula was put into practice in the field of statistics. The reason 
for the late application of this method was that only at that time numerical sampling-
techniques such as Markov chain Monte Carlo-methods (Gibbs-sampler, Metropolis-
Hastings  algorithm)  became  popular.  Nowadays,  with  the  sampling  techniques 
available, one can sample directly from the posterior density which is the joint density 
of likelihood and prior, without having to spell out probability densities for the prior 
and the likelihood separately. 
The described method of recovering information about a certain parameter can 
be extended to estimate the parameters of a regression model. Specifically, Lancaster 
(2004),  Koop  (2003),  and  Hansen  et  al.  (2004),  which  made  the  foundation  of 
Bayesian econometrics, suggest a 5-step algorithm to estimate the parameters of any 
regression model
24.  
Suppose that we  wish to estimate the parameters of a panel data regression 
model with two regressors of the following type: 
 
                                                (A2) 
 
In  the  first  step,  the  econometric  model  is  written  as  a  probability  model 
conditional upon different values for the set of parameters. For instance, we could 
have: 
 
                
                   (A3) 
                                                           
24 The Bayesian algorithm can be applied to any kind of regression model such as for instance, linear regressions, 
non-linear regressions, probit/logit regressions, instrumental variables regressions etc. in the context of time-series 




                                          (A4) 
 
Equations  (A3)  and  (A4)  state  that  the  dependent  variable  yi,t  can  be 
considered as the realization of a normal distribution with expected value given by the 
regression model itself. In the second step, for each parameter, prior information is 
written down in the form of a probability distribution. Usually vague or uninformative 
priors are taken so that priors encompass reasonable values for the parameters. For 
instance: 
 
                             (A5) 
                             (A6) 
                             (A7) 
        
                                 (A8) 
 
Equations (A5)-(A8) describe vague information about the parameters of the 
regression model by expressing them as a realization of a normal distribution with 
expected value zero and a wide variation. In the third step, the data are collected and 
inserted in the probability model. To this end, given the availability  of sampling-
techniques, the data are simply inputted in a Bayesian software. Step 4 then calculates 
the  updated  belief  about  each  parameter  by  sampling  numerically  from  the  joint 
posterior density which yields a full distribution for each parameter as follows: 
 
                                            (A9) 
 
Step  5  consists  of  critically  evaluating  the  results  by  changing  the  prior 
information. This is important to convince readers that the results are not driven by 
subjective choice of the prior values. Although usually vague priors are being used 
and although it can be shown that the data dominates the prior information when 
samples are large (likelihood dominance)
25, the use of prior information as a building 
                                                           
25 It can be shown that the posterior mean is the weighted sum of the prior mean and the sample mean with weights 
given by the precision (1/variance) of the prior mean and sample mean as follows:     
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           are the posterior mean, prior mean and sample mean, respectively and the weights are given by     
    
                   The larger N, the less will the posterior distribution depend on the prior, and the more on the 





block  in  addition  to  data  is  sometimes  perceived  problematic  for  non-Bayesian 
researchers.  
A  number  of  ready-made  software  packages  are  available  for  undertaking 
Bayesian inference. Among these are 1
st Bayes and WINBUGS (Bayesian Inference 
Using Gibbs Sampler). We use WINBUGS for our calculations of the firm-varying 
ICFS  estimates.  This  is  a  menu-driven  program  that  performs  the  Bayesian 
calculations using the GIBBS-sampler and offers a number of tools for exploring the 
posterior  densities  of  the  parameters.  In  addition,  the  program  offers  all  kinds  of 
diagnostic  statistics  such  as  trace  plots
26, histograms, density plots   and so on. A 
typical  WINBUGS-run  involves  syntax  checking,  data -loading,  specifying  initial 
values for the MCMC-chains, running the Bayesian calculations and exploring the 
posterior densities and diagnostic statistics.      
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 TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1. Proxies for financing constraints and hypotheses  
This table lists a number of variables related to the firm’s financial constraints status, which have been widely used in previous literature. lnTA stands for the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The penultimate column indicates the relationship between each variables and the firm’s financial constraints status. The last column 
summarizes the expected relationship between our proxies for financing constraints and the firm’s investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS), assuming that ICFS are a 
good proxy for financing constraints. For definitions of all variables, see Table 2. 
Observables      Variables  Relation with financial constraints    Hypotheses with respect to the ICFS   
                     
                    If the ICFS is a good indicator for financing      
                      constraints, then: 
Dividend payout policy    Payout ratio    negative       the payout ratio is negatively related to the ICFS  
Liquidity position     Cash ratio    negative       the cash ratio is negatively related to the ICFS 
Size        lnTA      negative       lnTA is negatively related to the ICFS     
Leverage position      Debt ratio    positive       the debt ratio is positively related to the ICFS 
Profitability position    EBIT/TA      negative       EBIT/TA is negatively related to the ICFS 
Interest coverage     Interest coverage   negative       the interest coverage is negatively related to the ICFS 





Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents a number of summary statistics for a selection of financial and general variables for our 
sample of 41,993 firm-year observations. TA (total assets) and Sales are measured in thousands of euros. LnTA 
and lnSales are the natural logarithm of total assets and total sales, respectively. Sales growth is the percentage 
change in total sales. (I/K) is the change in real net fixed assets (Plan, Property and Equipment) between year t 
and  t-1,  divided  by  beginning-of-year  capital  stock  K.  (CF/K)  is  net  income  after  interests  and  taxes  plus 
depreciation  and  amortization  divided  by  beginning-of-year  capital  stock.  Payout  ratio  is  the  sum  of  total 
dividends over total assets. Debt ratio is total debt divided by total assets. Cash ratio is liquid assets divided by 
total assets. Interest coverage is defined as net income divided by the sum of interest expenses and preferred 
dividends. (EBIT/TA) is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. EFD is external  finance 
dependence measured as the share of investments in fixed assets that cannot be funded through funds from 




n  mean  median  st.dev.  min  max 
TA  41,239  1,805  1,278  1,997  0.187  88,000 
lnTA  41,239  13.76  14.06  1.63  5.23  18.29 
Sales  12,874  3,860  1,832  5,933  0.100  172,000 
lnSales  12,874  13.63  14.42  2.59  1.94  18.96 
Salesgrowth  11,447  17.42%  5.63%  37.77%  -100%  100% 
I/K  32,505  31.20%  18.07%  34.76%  0.00%  131% 
CF/K  33,725  39.21%  31.65%  32.24%  -20.00%  120.00% 
Payout rate  41,239  0.91%  0.00%  2.79%  0.00%  17.00% 
Debt rate  35,817  65.71%  68.41%  19.80%  1.74%  98.00% 
Cash rate  41,239  10.95%  6.24%  13.16%  0.00%  100.00% 
Interest coverage  41,072  2.63  1.86  4.14  -10.00  10.00 
EBIT / TA  41,220  5.21%  4.58%  7.08%  -15.00%  27.00% 
EFD  41,993  16.86%  22.87%  30.19%  -81.00%  77.00% 
















Table 3. Investment opportunities proxies 
 
This table presents mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation for our measures of investment 
opportunities for our sample of 5,999 SMEs, over the observed sample period.  
 
Marginal Q  all years  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
                mean  2.27  2.17  1.99  1.93  2.75  2.96  3.27 
median  1.58  1.74  1.51  1.36  1.85  2.00  2.17 
min  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
max  17.39  17.39  17.39  17.39  17.39  17.39  17.39 
st.dev  2.59  1.96  2.08  2.31  3.00  3.21  3.45 
Accelerator  all years  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
mean  9.53  8.63  9.04  9.58  9.79  10.95  10.58 
median  5.25  4.96  4.98  5.24  5.10  5.92  6.13 
min  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
max  80.00  80.00  80.00  80.00  80.00  80.00  80.00 
st.dev  13.52  12.19  12.90  13.49  14.21  15.41  14.25 
GGAV  all years  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
mean  0.022  0.008  0.029  0.001  0.062  0.032  0.002 
median  0.034  0.016  0.041  0.018  0.062  0.047  0.018 
min  -0.380  -0.381  -0.382  -0.383  -0.384  -0.385  -0.386 
max  0.350  0.351  0.352  0.353  0.354  0.355  0.356 













Table 4. Reduced-form investment equations 
 
This table reports the regression results for the Marginal Q model (equation 1), the GGAV model (equation 3), the Accelerator model (equation 5), and for a benchmark 
model that does not control for investment opportunities. In Panel A, we report the results for the benchmark model and the Marginal Q model. In Panel B, we report the 
results for the GGAV model and the Accelerator model. FE, GMM and SYS-GMM represent respectively the Fixed Effects estimator, the GMM estimator developed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991), and the system-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Time dummies are included in all specifications. ICFS denote the long-run investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. Sargan reports the p-value of the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions, which tests the null that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term. 1
st 
order corr. reports the p-value for the test for 1st order autocorrelation of the differenced residuals. 2
nd order corr. reports the p-value for the test for 2
nd order autocorrelation 
of the differenced residuals.       
 
Panel A. Benchmark model and Marginal Q model 
 
Dep. var.: I/K  Benchmark model      Marginal Q model     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
(CF/K)  0.47  0.39  0.58  0.57  0.39  0.48  0.67  0.62 
  (0.007)***  (0.009)***  (0.018)***  (0.014)***  (0.009)***  (0.016)***  (0.021)***  (0.002)*** 
(I/K)-1  0.17  0.11  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.14  0.04  0.08 
  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)*** 
Q          0.02  0.05  0.01  0.02 
          (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.004)***  (0.003)*** 
ICFS  0.56  0.43  0.61  0.61  0.43  0.56  0.69  0.67 
N  27,274  22,678  22,197  27,274  22,678  22,679  16,941  22,679 
F-stat / Chi-2 stat  948***  913***  1,290***  1,719***  739***  287***  1,157***  1,410*** 
Sargan (p-value)      0.77  0.23      0.46  0.14 
1st order autocorr. (p-value)      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00 
2nd order autocorr. (p-value)      0.64  0.19      0.62  0.36 










Panel B. Accelerator model and GGAV model 
 
Dep. var.: I/K  Accelerator model       GGAV model     
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
(CF/K)  0.51  0.51  0.61  0.61  0.48  0.48  0.59  0.59 
  (0.018)***  (0.018)***  (0.030)***  (0.029)***  (0.007)***  (0.008)***  (0.012)***  (0.012)*** 
(I/K)-1  0.10  0.11  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.06  0.08 
  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.025)***  (0.016)***  (0.005)***  (0.005)***  (0.008)***  (0.006)*** 
(S-1 / K)  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01         
  (0.003)**  (0.003)**  (0.002)*  (0.002)*         
GGAV          0.18  0.17  0.04  0.04 
          (0.074)***  (0.073)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)*** 
ICFS  0.56  0.57  0.67  0.67  0.53  0.53  0.63  0.64 
N  27,274  22,678  22,197  27,274  22,678  22,679  16,941  22,679 
F-stat / Chi-2 stat  948***  913***  1,290***  1,719***  739***  287***  1,157***  1,410*** 
Sargan (p-value)      0.77  0.18      0.46  0.00 
1st order autocorr. (p-value)      0.00  0.00      0.00  0.00 
2nd order autocorr. (p-value)      0.64  0.19      0.62  0.36 






Table 5. Firm-varying ICFS estimates and their correlations 
 
ICFS-bench, ICFS-Q, ICFS-ACC, and ICFS-GGAV indicate the ICFS derived respectively from the 
benchmark  model  that  does  not  control  for  investment  opportunities,  the  Marginal  Q  model,  the 
Accelerator model, and the GGAV model. Panel A presents a number of summary statistics for the 
firm-varying ICFS estimates obtained from the different reduced-form investment equations, estimated 
using the Bayesian estimator described in the Appendix. P(x) represents the x
th percentile. Panel B 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficient between the firm-varying sensitivities in the four models. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.     
 
 
Panel A. Bayesian estimation 
  ICFS_bench  ICFS_Q  ICFS_ACC  ICFS_GGAV 
Mean  0.548  0.507  0.547  0.549 
Median  0.545  0.503  0.544  0.544 
Min  0.037  -0.151  0.039  -0.315 
Max  1.134  1.139  1.135  1.143 
st.dev  0.141  0.146  0.142  0.143 
P(0.01)  0.182  0.119  0.177  0.178 
P(0.05)  0.306  0.255  0.305  0.304 
P(0.10)  0.374  0.328  0.373  0.373 
P(0.30)  0.496  0.455  0.494  0.496 
P(0.70)  0.588  0.549  0.589  0.588 
P(0.90)  0.74  0.705  0.741  0.743 
P(0.95)  0.798  0.766  0.799  0.8 
P(0.99)  0.911  0.891  0.917  0.917 
prop. < 0  0.00%  0.03%  0.00%  0.05% 
prop. in (0, 0.5)  31.28%  47.04%  31.57%  31.23% 
prop. in (0.50, 1)  68.54%  52.67%  68.26%  68.56% 
prop. > 1  0.15%  0.10%  0.15%  0.17% 
 
 
Panel B. Correlations 
  ICFS_bench  ICFS_Q  ICFS_ACC  ICFS_GGAV 
ICFS_bench  1       
ICFS_Q  0.989***  1     
ICFS_ACC  0.997***  0.989***  1   






















Table 6. Ex-post regression analysis 
 
This table presents the  estimates obtained  from regressing the  firm-varying ICFS estimates on the 
proxies  for  financing  constraints  using  OLS.  ICFS-bench,  ICFS-Q,  ICFS-ACC,  and  ICFS-GGAV 
indicate the ICFS derived respectively from the benchmark model that does not control for investment 
opportunities, the Marginal Q model, the Accelerator model, and the GGAV model. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and clustered at the firm-level. RMSE 
is the root mean squared error. R²adj is the adjusted R
2. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.  
 
Dep. var.: ICFS(i)   ICFS_bench  ICFS_Q  ICFS_acc  ICFS_GGAV 
payout ratio  -0.59  -0.63  -0.60  -0.61 
  (0.054)***  (0.056)***  (0.044)***  (0.055)*** 
lnTA  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)*** 
cash ratio  -0.06  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06 
  (0.015)***  (0.016)***  (0.015)***  (0.016)*** 
debt ratio  0.12  0.13  0.12  0.12 
  (0.008)***  (0.009)***  (0.008)***  (0.008)*** 
EBIT / TA  -0.07  -0.10  -0.07  -0.07 
  (0.031)**  (0.033)***  (0.031)***  (0.032)*** 
interest coverage  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)*  (0.001)* 
external finance dependence  0.09  0.09  0.09  0.09 
  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)***  (0.006)*** 
          N  35,725  35,726  35,727  35,728 
F-stat  104.84***  115.01***  105.42***  104.90*** 
R² adj.  0.11  0.12  0.11  0.11 


























Table 7. Mean values in different ICFS classes  
 
This table present mean values for the proxies for financing constraints in two mutually exclusive ICFS 
classes for the benchmark model (panel A), the Marginal Q model (panel B), the Accelerator model 
(panel C) and the GGAV model (panel  D). Firms are assigned to the high (low) ICFS class if they are 
characterized  by  an  ICFS  higher  (lower)  than  the  70
th  percentile  (30
th  percentile)  of  the  ICFS 
distribution. The last column in each Panel presents t-values from an independent samples t-test. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. 
 
Panel A. Benchmark model 
  Low ICFS  High ICFS  t-stat 
payout ratio  1.43%  0.48%  26.26*** 
lnTA  14.02  14.07  -4.25*** 
cash ratio  14.00%  9.51%  26.60*** 
debt ratio  60.78%  69.84%  -34.92*** 
EBIT / TA  6.68%  4.62%  23.29*** 
interest coverage  3.64  2.26  27.18*** 
external finance dependence  9.03%  24.77%  -42.53*** 
 
Panel B. Marginal Q model 
  Low ICFS  High ICFS  t-stat 
payout ratio  1.44%  0.47%  26.83*** 
lnTA  14.02  14.07  -3.76*** 
cash ratio  14.16%  9.44%  27.87*** 
debt ratio  60.48%  69.91%  -36.43*** 
EBIT / TA  6.81%  4.52%  25.78*** 
interest coverage  3.71  2.21  29.49*** 
external finance dependence  9.31%  24.88%  -42.25*** 
 
Panel C. Accelerator model 
  Low ICFS  High ICFS  t-stat 
payout ratio  1.42%  0.49%  25.63*** 
lnTA  14.01  14.07  -5.31*** 
cash ratio  13.99%  9.48%  26.69*** 
debt ratio  60.71%  69.85%  -35.15*** 
EBIT / TA  6.68%  4.62%  23.12*** 
interest coverage  3.64  2.25  27.17*** 
external finance dependence  9.27%  24.58%  -41.22*** 
 
Panel D. GGAV model 
  Low ICFS  High ICFS  t-stat 
payout ratio  1.41%  0.48%  25.68*** 
lnTA  14.01  14.07  -4.87*** 
cash ratio  14.04%  9.53%  26.66*** 
debt ratio  60.59%  69.72%  -35.20*** 
EBIT / TA  6.66%  4.64%  22.68*** 
interest coverage  3.63  2.27  26.61*** 
external finance dependence  9.06%  24.67%  -42.18*** 
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